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1. Introduction
The present paper derives the optimal monetary policy function, in a simple model with nominal
rigidities. The kind of monetary policy reaction function here analyzed belongs to the Taylot-type
class, where short term nominal interest rate reacts with respect to ination rate, output (or output
gap) together with a coe¢ cient of a lagged interest rate itself.
The search of the optimal monetary policy function identied by a collection of parameter
values maximizing a specic welfare criterion, has recently become one of the most debated topics
in monetary economics.
The crucial novelty of the approach followed in this paper is given by the type of welfare
measure derived from a solution algorithm based on a second order approximation of the whole
model, including constraints and rst order conditions, as described by Kim, Kim, Schaumburg
and Sims (2003). Di¤erently from other existing studies, the metric for welfare is here o¤ered by
a second order expansion of the utility function conditional to the non-stochastic steady state1 .
The optimal monetary policy combination found in this model lies within the usual range of
parameters, accepted by the empirical literature, but the size of the ination targeting coe¢ cient
is smaller than what has been found in the current literature. Moreover, the results show that the
usage of rst order based welfare measures or unconditional welfare might deliver highly misleading
results. The advantage of conditional second order based welfare measure is related with the correct
evaluation of welfare during the transitional period from a steady state to another. Impulse
Response functions based on second order approximation show a non-a¢ ne pattern when the
economy is hit by shocks of di¤erent magnitude.
The approach undertaken in this paper closely follows the recent developments of Dynamic
Stochastic General Equilibrium monetary models, known as New Neoclassical Synthesisaccord-
ing to Goodfriend and King (1997). This literature mixes up the fully rational expectation Real
Business Cycle modelling framework with the microfoundations of nominal rigidities, belonging to
the standard apparatus of Keynesian models. A collection of remarkable papers aiming to nd
optimal monetary policy reaction function is contained in a famous book edited by Taylor (1999)2 .
The only nominal rigidity included in the present paper is represented by price stickiness. Such
choice is motivated by the need to make the model as much as comparable as possible with the ex-
isting literature, especially becasue optimal results are obtained under a di¤erent solution method
and a di¤erent welfare method. In what follows, money is inserted via the transaction cost ap-
proach: this makes the construction of the model much more general and avoids misunderstandings
in the interpretation of money demand shocks.
A further element contrasting with respect to the existing literature is given by the explicit
consideration of scal policy: in the existing literature, scal policy is only assumed to be Ricar-
dian, i.e. including a solvency constraint on the government, as for example in Rotemberg and
Woodford (1999). On the other hand, the present paper takes explicitly into consideration the
1Sutherland (2002), Schmitt Grohè and Uribe (2002) and Kollmann (2002) all use welfare measures based on
unconditional welfare measures.
2Other important contributions in this area are those by King and Watson (1996), Ohanian et al. (1995), Chari
et al. (2000).
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role of the government budget constraint into the model solution for the comparative evaluation
of the various monetary policy rules.
According to Leeper (1991), Sims (1994) scal policy requirements on the future path of primary
surpluses are a necessary complement to monetary policy rules in order to achieve full price stability.
In the present model, I assume a scal policy rule making taxes reacting to the outstanding stock
of real public debt. Such policy rule is dened Passive in Leepers terminology, or Ricardian
in Woodfords terminology. These assumptions are considered on both cases with and without
distortionary taxation.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section discusses the main assumptions
underlying the model. A separate section studies the assumptions underlying Governments be-
havior. Moreover, the reaction functions of monetary authority are presented in a separate section.
Three additional sections discussing, respectively, the characteristics of the equilibrium, calibration
and the assumptions underlying the variant of the basic model with distortionary taxation. The
solution method including a discussion of welfare measures and impulse-responses is discussed in a
subsequent section. Another section discusses the empirical ndings. Concluding remarks close
the paper.
2. The model
The model is populated by j-th measured on the real line between [0,1]. The utility function of
each agent j is:
U jt = E0
1X
t=0
tu

Cjt ; L
j
t

(1)
where the instantaneous utility function u

Cjt ; L
j
t

is:
u

Cjt ; L
j
t

=
h
C
(1 )
jt (1  Ljt)
i1  1
1  1
(2)
with  > 0: In (2) I considered a weakly separable utility function in both consumption Cjt and
labor e¤ort Ljt . This allows a better propagation mechanism for the shocks included in the model.
The representative agents budget constraint is given by:
PtC
j
t
h
1 + jtf

V jt
i
+Bjt +M
j
t = (1 + it 1)B
j
t 1 +M
j
t 1 + w
j
tL
j
t + Pt

j
t   PtT jt (3)
From (3) each household j receive income from investing in nominal bonds Bjt (the superscript
indicates that bonds are owned by agent j) paying nominal interest it, and from labor income
wjtL
j
t . Additionally, each agent pays real lump sum taxes T
j
t . Money holdings M
j
t enter the
budget constraint in two ways: one direct, and one indirect via the denition of the money
velocity V jt =
PtC
j
t
Mjt
. Moreover, 
jt indicates the prot gained by agent j in participating to rm
j.
According to the transaction cost approach, to buy an amount of goods PtC
j
t each household
must spend an additional amount given by PtC
j
t 
j
tf

V jt

. In (3), f

V jt

is the transaction cost
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function and jt is a transaction cost shock represented by the following AR(1) process:
log

jt

= +
 
1  

log
 
j

+  log

jt 1

+ "t (4)
with E

"t

= 0; V ar

"t

= 2 . The transaction cost approach has the advantage of making
money demand shocks as transaction cost shocks, di¤erently from preference shocks, as it occurs
when money enters directly into the utility function. The transaction cost function f

V jt

is
increasing in velocity V jt , i.e. f
0

V jt

> 0. Here I assume convex transaction cost, by setting
f
00

V jt

> 0. The assumption of convex transaction costs rules out indeterminacy under active
monetary policy, which, in our setting is equivalent to require that monetary policy follows an
interest rate pegging rule with an ination targeting coe¢ cient bigger than one. However, this is
equivalent to assume that there is no barter equilibrium for this economy. A concave transaction
cost function, with f
00

V jt

< 0, instead makes possible the existence of a barter equilibrium with
a zero money in steady state and a positive nominal interest rate.
In what follows, I adopt a concave transaction cost function like:
f
 
V j

=
V j
1 + V j
(5)
Function (5) has been suggested by Sims (1994).
Intertemporal First Order Conditions. Given the above assumptions, the representative
agents problem consists in maximizing the utility function (1)-(2) subjected to the budget con-
straint (3), with respect to consumption Cjt , labor income L
j
t , money M
j
t and bond holdings B
j
t .
The rst order conditions with respect to Cjt , L
j
t ; M
j
t , B
j
t are respectively given by:
jt
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(8)
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jt+1
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(9)
In (6)-(9) jt indicates the Lagrange multiplier associated to the representative agent budget
constraint (3). The households problem is completed by the inclusion of a Transversality condi-
tion.
Condition (6) is the usual rst order condition on consumption, while condition (7) equates
the marginal disutility from working to labor remuneration discounted with the marginal utility
of consumption. Equation (8) nests a money demand function, and condition (9) derives from
the optimal allocation of bonds. By mixing together equation (8)-(9) we nd the following money
demand function:
1
(1 + it)
=

1  tf
0 
V jt

V jt
2
(10)
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In order to explore the characteristics of (10), I assume that the economy is in a non-stochastic
steady state3 , with t+1 = , V
j
t = V , t = , for all t and j. Furthermore, we can simplify money
demand function (10), as follows:


= 1  f 0 (V )V 2 (11)
with V is the steady state money velocity. In particular, the steady state real money balances
m =M=P are given by:
m =
(1 )

C
where:
 =

1   1

1=2
In order to nd a solution of the model for a wide range of policy parameter values, I impose
that  < 1, as in Sims (1994).
A variant of the model includes a distortionary tax on labor income: Lt WtLt; with 
L
t as tax
rate. In this case, the rst order condition (7) is replaced by:
C
(1 )(1  1 )
t (1  Lt)(1 
1
 ) 1 = jt
 
1  Lt

Wt
The presence of distortionary taxation makes the model comparable to other papers considered
in the literature, like, for example Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2003). Distortionary taxation adds
a real rigidity: this sheds additional light on the interactions between scal and monetary policy,
in the denition of the optimal monetary policy rule.
The intra-temporal choice problem. Given the presence of a large number of nal goods,
each agent chooses the composition of a basket of di¤erentiated goods. On this ground, the variable
Cjt represents an index of all the di¤erentiated goods produced in this economy. Following Dixit
and Stiglitz (1977) the basket Cjt is dened by a CES aggregator over all the i 2 [0; 1] nal goods
as:
Cjt =
Z 1
0

Cjt (i)
  1

 
 1
(12)
where  > 1, indicates the elasticity of substitution between di¤erent nal goods varieties. Let Xjt
be the total expenditure of agent j. The optimal composition of varieties within basket Cjt in (12)
can be derived by maximizing index (12) over Cjt (i) for all i 2 [0; 1] subjected to an expenditure
constraint. The solution to the intra-temporal denes the aggregate price index Pt:
Pt =
Z 1
0
pt(i)
1 di
 1
1 
(13)
Moreover, the demand of variety i expressed by each agent j is:
Cjt (i)
Cjt
=

pt(i)
Pt
 
(14)
3A variable at time t; Xt, in steady state is indexed as X, without time subscript, for all i and j 2 [0; 1].
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where  is the elasticity of good i with respect to its price.
For what concerns public expenditure, I assume that government reveals a demand for goods
Gt which has to be allocated in terms of j-varieties of di¤erentiated goods. The total demand for
goods Gt is given by:
Gt =
Z 1
0
G
 1

t (j) dj
 
 1
Thus, by using an optimization process similar to (12)-(??), we nd that the demand for variety
j expressed by the government is:
Pt (j)
Pt
=

Gt (j)
Gt
 1=
(15)
The aggregate demand for variety j can be expressed as:
Ct (j) +Gt (j) = Yt (j) (16)
So that:
Pt (j)
Pt
=

Yt (j)
Yt
 1=
(17)
with Yt (j) dened as in (16). After aggregating (16) over all j-varieties we get: Yt = Ct +Gt.
2.1. Firms. I assume the existence of a large number of imperfectly competitive rms indexed
on the real line, each producing a single variety j 2 [0; 1]. Thus, each rm has control on the price
of each variety j; Pt(j), but not on the aggregate price level Pt: Nominal rigidities are introduced
via cost of price adjustment, described by the following function:
PACpt (j) =
p
2

Pt(j)
Pt 1(j)
  
2
(18)
where  is the steady state ination rate. According to (18) every time a rm decides to change
the price of variety j has to pay a cost in terms of output. In particular, the cost of changing
price is positive when the rate of price change of variety j di¤ers from steady state ination rate
. A similar approach has been adopted by Kim (2000) and Hairault and Portier (1993). In the
menu cost literature à la Rotemberg (1982)  is set to  = 1, implying that each rm pays a cost
of changing price at all, not necessarily according to the steady state level of the ination rate.
The degree of price stickiness in the economy is entirely governed by the magnitude of parameter
p  0: Under (18) cost of price adjustment are zero in steady state.
The production function is assumed to be of Cobb-Douglas type:
Yt (j) = At (gyLt (j))
1  (19)
where gy is the exogenous growth rate of labor-augmenting technical progress, and At indicates a
time dependent technological shock, for which I assume the following AR(1) process:
logAt = (1  A) logA+ A logAt 1 + "At (20)
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with "At  N
 
0; 2A

.
The prot maximization problem for each rm j consists in nding the optimal amount of labor
input Lt (j) by maximizing the following prot function:

t (j) =
1X
t=0
t

Pt (j)
Pt
Yt (j) WtLt (j)  PACpt (j)

(21)
subjected to the production function (19), the total demand for variety j given in (17) and the price
adjustment cost function (18). In (21) t indicates the intertemporal rate of discount employed
by each rm to evaluate future prot streams.
As it is customary in the recent literature on microfounded monetary models, I posit an ho-
mogeneity condition on the behavior of all rms, by setting Xt (j) = Xt for all j 2 [0; 1]. This
assumption allows to simplify algebra and avoids the need to keep track of the entire price distri-
bution across rms.
The rst order conditions for rmsprot maximization, after the imposition of the homogeneity
assumption, delivers the following expression for the equilibrium wage rate (in real terms):
Wt = (1  )

1  1
yt

Yt
Lt
(22)
where:
1
yt
=
1


1  p (t   ) + Et
t+1
t
p (t+1   )2t+1
Yt+1
Yt

(23)
The variable yt dened in (23) is the output demand elasticity augmented by the cost of price
adjustment weighted by the utility. In steady state, with zero cost of price adjustment the output
demand elasticity equates the elasticity of substitution across di¤erentiated goods, i.e.: yt = 
y.
From (23) the mark up over marginal costs is t =

1  1
yt
 1
. Thus, with perfectly exible
prices when p = 0, the markup is constant. In the perfectly competitive case, when 
y
t ! 1;
the markup is equal to unity.
An interesting feature of the formulation of nominal rigidities adopted by (18) is that with
sticky prices the markup becomes endogenous and works as a transmission channel for real and
nominal shocks hitting both ination and output via equation (23): a shock decreasing yt lowers
the mark up, because of the lower degree of monopolistic market power.
3. Fiscal Policy and Government behavior
The government budget constraint in nominal terms is:
Bt   (1 + it 1)Bt 1 +Mt  Mt 1 = PtGt   PtTt (24)
From (24) the primary decit (surplus) Gt   Tt plus the interest rate proceedings paid by Gov-
ernment to the owner of government debt it 1Bt 1 is nanced either by printing new money
Mt  Mt 1 or by issuing new debt Bt  Bt 1.
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Of course, the equilibrium conditions on both debt and money market are such that demand
meets supply at any instant t, so that the total amount of debt and money oating in the market
are entirely owned by j-th households. In fact:
Bt =
Z 1
0
Bjt dj, Mt =
Z 1
0
M jt dj, and Tt =
Z 1
0
T jt dj (25)
As pointed out by Sims (1994), the ination can be viewed as scal phenomenon: if the
government is perceived to adopt a loose scal policy, the ination rate will explode right from
today, discounting the future increase of money supply needed to wash out the level of debt. This
occurs in expectation even if seigniorage revenues are very small and the commitment to avoid the
usage of money printing is very strong.
To prevent an explosive solution for price level, I include the following scal policy reaction
function:
Tt =  0 +  1
Bt 1
Pt
(26)
As in Leeper (1991) and Sims (1994), given (26), a scal policy is dened to be passivewhen  1
lies in the following range:  
 1   1 <  1 <   1 + 1 (27)
For an equilibrium price level to be determinate, condition (27) has to be respected and coupled
with an activemonetary policy rule, identied as an interest rate pegging rule whose ination
targeting coe¢ cient is set to be bigger than one.
In case of distortionary taxation, the tax rule considered in (26) becomes:
Lt WtLt =  0 +  1
Bt 1
Pt
(28)
Finally, I assume that the aggregate level of public expenditure Gt follows an AR(1) process,
given by
log (Gt) = (1  G) logG+ G log (Gt 1) + "Gt+1 (29)
with "Gt+1 i.i.d. variable normally distributed with zero mean and constant variance, 
2
G.
4. Monetary Policy Rules
I consider alternative monetary policy rules whose behavior has been carefully studied in both
theoretical and applied works. All the rules discussed here are reported in log-linear framework.
4.1. Taylor Rules. All the rules considered in the present paper have been obtained as variants
of the following general interest-rate pegging rule:
it = i+
TiX
n=1
in (it 1   i) +
TX
n=1
n (t 1   ) +
TxX
n=1
xn (Yt 1   Y ) + mpt (30)
where it is a measure of the nominal interest rate (the Federal Funds Rate in the empirical literature
on US economy). The advantage of making use of rules embedded in (30) is given by the restrict
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number of parameters to be controlled by monetary authority. Under rules like (30), money supply
becomes endogenous, since monetary authority sets interest rate by letting the quantity of money
to be determined by market clearing conditions.
In equation (30) I also included a shock mpt modelled as an AR(1):
log (mpt ) =
 
1  mp

log (mp) + mp log
 
mpt 1

+ "mpt (31)
where "mpt is an i.i.d. process distributed as "
mp
t  N
 
0; 2mp

. This assumption allows for a
better internal propagation mechanism, as suggested by Furher and Moore (1995).
In this work I am going to study the impact on welfare induced by the following Taylor Rules:
eit = et + y eYt + ieit 1 + mpt (32)eit = Etet+1 + y eYt + ieit 1 + mpt (33)
where mpt has been dened in (31). Equation (32)-(33) indicates the set of basic Taylor Rules to
be considered in the optimality analysis.
The standard Taylor rule is given by equation (32), with i = 0:0. This is the classical rule
assumed by Taylor (1993,1999), where  = 1:5, y = 0:5; i = 0:0, obtained after estimating the
rule after 1979 for US economy.
Rotemberg and Woodford (1999) in a simple model show that a rule like in (32) with  = 1:22,
y = 0:06, i = 0:0 is the optimal Taylor Rule for the US economy.
The forward-looking variant of Taylor Rule is represented by equation (33), where monetary
authority sets current nominal rate as reacting to future ination and output has been suggested
- among others - by Clarida, Galì and Gertler (2000), on the basis of empirical results.
4.2. Rules based on monetary aggregate targeting. The evaluation of Taylor-type mon-
etary policy rules should also be considered against the alternative represented by monetary ag-
gregate targeting rules. According to Kim (2000) and Ireland (1997), I adopt the following
specication for a monetary aggregate targeting rule:
log(t) = M log(t 1) + (1  M ) log(gm) + (1 + ) log(gmt) + (34)
+ log

Rt
R

  vi log

Rt 1
R

where:
t =
Mt
Mt 1
(35)
and:
log(gmt) = m log(gmt 1) + "
m
t (36)
with "mt  N
 
0; 2m

. From (34) monetary authority targets a mix between a monetary aggregate
and nominal interest rate, and nominal interest rate is residually determined within the system,
if one accepts - as in the present paper - the vision which sees rule (34) as determining nominal
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money. In (34) gmt indicates a shock to money growth rate, represented via the AR(1) process
given in (36).
The sensitivity of money supply to interest rate movements is identied by parameter : higher
, smoother will be the response of interest rate to money growth shocks. A pure monetary
aggregate targeting rule is obtained with  = 0: in this case monetary authority cares only about
money supply. If  = 1, there is a one-to-one correspondence between nominal rate changes and
money growth rule. When  =1, monetary authority cares only about interest rate movements.
The role of interest rate smoothing is subsumed by parameter i: with i = 0, monetary authority
targets only current nominal rate. If i > 0 monetary authority smooths interest rate by targeting
both actual and last periods interest rate.
5. Equilibrium and Calibration
5.1. Equilibrium. I posit an homogeneity assumption by setting Xt (j) = Xt for all j 2 [0; 1],
for each variable of the system. This assumption avoids to keep track of the entire price distribution
across di¤erent nal goods varieties.
From Euler equation the steady state level of gross ination rate is:
gx = x (1 + i) (37)
where x indicates the discount rate of the transformed economy, whose relationship with the
discount rate for the non-transformed one  is given by: x = 
(1 )(1  1 )gx:
Furthermore, I assume that each agent has access to a set of complete markets for contingent
claims. This that the discount factor for consumers must equal that of rms:
t+1
t
= x
t+1
t
(38)
We can rationalize condition (38) by supposing the existence of a representative agent who can
freely exchange shares of whatsoever rm operating in this economy, without paying any sort
of transaction cost at all. The inclusion of an additional rst order condition for the optimal
allocation of shares would produce a similar result.
To save notation, I indicate the variables of the transformed economy associated to the non-
stochastic steady state with the same variable without the time subscript t.
5.2. Calibration. The model is calibrated on the basis of data of the US economy relatively
to the sample period 1959:1-2001:4, quarterly observations.
The coreparameters of the model are reported in Table 1, while in Table 2 I reported the policy
parameters, i.e. the parameters of the reaction functions of both monetary and scal authorities.
The discount rate of the transformed economy has been set equal to 0.9978, implying a discount
factor for the non-transformed economy equal to 1.0071.
The growth rate of real GDP of the US economy over the specied sample period is 1.76% on
an yearly basis, which corresponds to a quarterly growth rate equal to 1.0044 (in gross terms). To
measure the steady state nominal interest rate, I considered the mean of the Federal Funds Rate
which is equal to 6.47% per year, equivalent to a 1.61% in quarterly terms.
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Parameter x gy   y  
Value .9978 1.0044 .07723 .6 10 0.1 0.33
Table 1: Basic Parameters
Parameter  1  y i i  M
Value 0.05 free free free 0.999 0.576 -0.158
Table 2: Policy Parameters
From First Order Condition on Bonds computed in steady state (37), we nd a quarterly
ination rate (in gross terms) equal to 1.009499, implying an annual ination rate equal to 3.8%
(the value of the annual ination rate computed over the specied sample period by using the GDP
deator is equal to 3.78%).
The real interest rate is gyx = 1:0066, equivalent to 2.64% in annual terms.
As in Rotemberg and Woodford (1999), I assume a share of Aggregate Consumption over GDP
Sc equal to 0.57. Moreover, I assume that the total amount of transaction costs is 2% of GDP in
year terms, equivalent to 0.5% on a quarterly basis: this determines a value of  equal to .07723.
From data on M1, consumption over non-durable goods and CPI we get a value for velocity4
equal to 0.46. With the above parameters, the value of money velocity implied by the model is
given by V = 0:38. The steady state level of debt is calibrated in order to have a debt/GDP ratio
equal to 0.44, as in Schmitt-Grohè and Uribe (2001).
The amount of labor e¤ort L supplied by each agent is calibrated by considering the ratio of
market to non-market activities obtained from data. As in the current literature, this ratio is
L
1 L = 0:289017, implying a value for L = 0:2243: With these number from equation (??) we
derive the value of parameter  matching the ratio L1 L . This value is 0.6, as reported in Table 1.
Parameter A is calibrated by matching the steady state value of output implied by the model
with the value of Y obtained from US data5 , given by 20.12.
The elasticity of intertemporal substitution  has been set equal to 0.16 .
4Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans (2001) show a velocity value equal to 0.44. Their denition of velocity
is computed with respect to output, not consumption. Taking into account the quantitative relationship existing
between consumption and output here described, it is possible to obtain a value for money velocity very close to
the number showed by Christiano et al. (2001).
5The value for GDP from US data equal to 20.12 is the mean over the sample 1959:1-2001:4 for the real GDP (sea-
sonally adjusted) transformed according to the following methodology: it = 1+ (FFRt=400) ; Mt = 1000(M2t=N);
Pt = GNPDEt, Yt = 1000(GNPt=N), where FFRt is the Federal Funds Rate, M2t is M2, N is the population
dened as the total civilian noninstitutional, GNPDEt is the Implicit Price deator of Gross National Product,
and GNPt, is the Gross National Product.
6The value proposed by Rotemberg and Woodford (1999) is  = 0:17 and that proposed by Kim (2000) for an
estimated model  = 0:08.
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The elasticity of substitution across di¤erentiated goods has been set equal to y = 10; implying
a steady state level of the markup equal to 1.1, as it is common in the literature on monopolistic
competition.
The parameters of the monetary policy reaction function are considered as free: the sensitivity
analysis will shed light on the role of the policy parameters in welfare evaluation and second order
models t. The parameter values for the monetary aggregate rule have been obtained from Kim
(2000).
The parameters of the AR(1) process driving the stochastic side of the model are reported in
Table 3.
Parameter A   G m
Value 0.98 0.99 0.74 0.95 0.487
Table 3: AR coe¢ cients
The variance-covariance matrix is:
" =
26664
2A 0 0 0
0 2 0 0
0 0 2i 0
0 0 0 2G
37775 =
26664
:0003 0 0 0
0 :00196 0 0
0 0 0:001109 0
0 0 0 :000126
37775 (39)
The value for A, has been obtained from Kim (2000), as well as the value for the variances of the
stochastic process for technology and xed cost shock, reported in the variance-covariance matrix
(39). The values for  has been estimated, after having considered the denition for  derived
from the calibration exercise, as well as the value for the variance7 2 .
To get the volatility parameters of the monetary policy reaction function, I estimated the
following equation: eRt = R eRt 1 + 4X
l=0
let l + 2X
l=0
yl eYt l + mpt (40)
over the sample period 1979:3-2001:4, quarterly observations.
I estimated equation (40) by using the Generalized Method of Moments proposed by Hansen
(1982), over the sample 1979:3-2001:4, quarterly observations. From this estimate I have obtained
the volatility of the residuals mpt and I have tested for the degree of autocorrelation of 
mp
t .
A selective report of the estimated coe¢ cients is collected in Table 4 (t-statistics in parenthesis):
7The regression estimated is: log (t) =  log
 
t 1

+"t : From IV estimation (instruments: four lagged values of
t) we get (standard errors in brackets):  = :99 (.00160), D.W.: 1.059. The variance of residuals is 
2
 = 0:00196:
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0 1 2 y0 y1 R
1.25 1.2 0.638 0.378 1.04 0.65
(2.86) (2.84) (2.93) (2.13) (2.27) (10.47)
Table 4: Estimated Coe¢ cients
The R
2
of the regression is 0:836; the overidentifying restrictions are passed with a 1% of
signicance. The results reported in Table 4 are perfectly in line with what has been reported by
Clarida, Galì and Gertler (2000). I tested for the level of autocorrelation of order 1 for mpt . In
this case, I adopted an LM test which produces a value for the test statistics equal to 29.481671,
which, after comparison with 2 (1), forces to strongly reject the null of absence of autocorrelation
of order 1.
I also estimated another regression in order to pin down both the AR(1) coe¢ cient mp of
equation (31) and the variance 2i . From this simple regression we get mp = 0:74 (t-statistics:
8.8), and a value of the volatility of the overall regression given by 2i = 0:001109.
The values of the parameters of the money supply rule (34)-(36) i, m, , M reported in
Tables 2 and 3 have been obtained by Kim (2000). The same criteria applies to the volatility of
the growth rate of money supply from (36) for which I set 2m = :00002:
6. Solution Method
The model is solved via an Accurate Second Order Solution, as outlined by Sims (2001a) and
Kim et al. (2003) adapted to a large scale dynamic general equilibrium model with a multiplicity
of state variables. The reason for that is given by the need to have a framework useful to make
accurate welfare comparisons across policies that do not have rst order e¤ects on the deterministic
steady state. The recent literature on monetary policy nds its main contribution in the cross
comparisons among di¤erent types of monetary policy functions. The metric for this comparison
is o¤ered by the utility reached by representative agent.
In the current literature there are examples in a very specic context where it is possible to
explicitly obtain an exact expression for the utility -based welfare criterion. These contributions
are: Obstfeld and Rogo¤ (2002), Erceg, Henderson and Levin (2000). An explicit second-order
approximation has been derived by Rotemberg and Woodford (1997,1999). The general strategy
pursued by these authors is to obtain a solution of the full model up to rst order and to insert
this solution into an expanded version of the utility function expanded up to second order. This
strategy delivers accurate welfare results only if the model posseses a steady state exactly coincident
with the rst best. Since the economy under study contains several elements of rigidity which do
not disappear in steady state, we need a more accurate welfare measure, like that obtained from a
second order approximation of the whole model. Following the details contained in a companion
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paper (see Marzo 2004b) the solution can be expressed as follows:
dy
(2)
t = F
st f1g f1g dy(2)t 1 + Fst f1g f2g"t + Fst f2g f1g

dw
(1)
t 1 
 dw(1)t 1

(41)
+Fst f2g f2g

"t 
 dw(1)t 1

+ Fst f2g f3g2 ("t 
 "t) + Fuscon2
where dy(2)t is the second order solution of the model, here intended as the deviation from the steady
state, while dw(1)t 1 is the vector of disturbances having an AR(1) representation (see Appendix ..
for further details). Moreover, Fst f1g f1g, Fst f1g f2g ; Fst f2g f1g, Fst f2g f2g, Fst f2g f3g are
matrices dened in Marzo (2004b);  is the standard deviation of i.i.d. errors "t.
6.1. An utility-based welfare measure. Given the solution to the model, with representa-
tion in (41), in general, a second order expansion of the utility u (y) around the non-stochastic
steady state vector of variables y is:
U0 (y0) = E0
" 1X
t=0
tu (yt)
#
 (42)
 E0
" 1X
t=0
ru (y) dy(2)t +
1
2
vec
 r2u (y)0 dw(1)t 
 dw(1)t 
#
The above expression can be rewritten as:
U2 (y0) =
h
ru (y) 12vec
 r2u (y)0 i
8><>: [I   xG1]
 1
 
dy0
dy0 
 dy0
!
+
x (1  x) 1 [I   xG1] 1G22
9>=>; (43)
Equation (43) is the accurate welfare expression based on the full second order solution of the
model, given by equation (41). It is a conditional welfare measure, because it is conditional to the
initial steady state perturbation dy0 . The unconditional welfare measure is given by:
UNC = (1  x) 1
h
ru (y) 12vec
 r2u (y)0 i [I  G1] 1G22 (44)
From (43) the rst order welfare measure can be obtained by setting equal to zero all second order
moments.
The large majority of contributions in the litereature employ conditional welfare to evaluate
policy alternatives. From (41), it is clear that unconditional welfare evaluates the level of welfare
at the steady state. However, since moving from one steady state to another, becasue of policy
e¤ects takes time, the unconditional welfare measures do not take into account the welfare e¤ects
during the transition periods.
6.2. Second Order Impulse-Responses. Given the full second order solution (41), it is
possible to recover the expression for the accurate forecasting matrices, which will serve as a basis
for the impulse response analysis. After using matrix Z, the second order accurate evolution of
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dyt is: "
dy
(2)
t
dy
(1)
t 
 dy(1)t
 # = G1 " dy(2)t 1
dy
(1)
t 1 
 dy(1)t 1
 #+G22 + (45)
+G3
264 Im 0 00 Im(n q) 0
0 0 2Im2
375" "tet
#
where et =  ("t 
 dyt 1)0 ; ("t 
 "t   e)00. The size of matrices in (45) is dened asG1  n+ n2  n+ n2 ;
G2
 
n+ n2  1, G3  n+ n2 m+mn+m2 : Finally, the T -step ahead forecast is given by:
E0
h
dy
(2)
T
i
=
h
Z 0
i
E0
"
dw
(2)
T
dw
(1)
1T 
 dw(1)1T
 # (46)
with dw0 = Z 0dy0. Equation (46) represents our expression for impulse response analysis. An
interesting feature of this method lies in the fact that the T -period ahead expectations do not
diverge as the horizon increases. This is very important, and it is di¤erent from what has been
proposed in the current literature (see, for example Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe, 2001b).
7. Results
The analysis proceeds under two steps: the discussion about the optimal monetary policy function
and about the pattern of impulse-response functions. The goal of this section is to show what is
the combination of parameters for the monetary policy function à la Taylor which maximize the
conditional welfare measure above described. For completeness, I am going to consider the results
for three welfare measures: a second order-based conditional welfare measure (given by U2), based
on (41), the unconditional welfare measure (UUN ) based on (44), and a welfare measure based on
the rst order solution method U1.
In order to have a simple and intuitive measure usable to rank policy alternatives, the results
derived from welfare analysis are reported in terms of units of forgone consumption, or certainty
equivalent consumption. Therefore, C2 C1 CUN indicate, respectively, the units of certainty
equivalent consumption obtained from second order Conditional welfare solution (C2); the units
of forgone consumption from rst order solution (C1), and the certainty equivalent consumption
measure from the Unconditional welfare measure (CUN ). Basically, the level of consumption
associated to each welfare measure is derived from the utility function as follows:
CAi =
"  
1  1

UAi
(1  L)(1  1 )
# 1
(1 )(1  1 )
(47)
with i = 1; 2; UN: From (47) we recover the level of consumption associated to a given conguration
policy, derived from the welfare measures based on rst order approximation (UA1 ), conditional
second order (UA2 ) and unconditional (U
A
UN ).
Optimal Monetary Policy in a Simple Distorted Economy 16
[In other words, the unit of certainty equivalent consumption makes the representative agent
indi¤erent between a situation where she can consume that specic amount of C (C1, C2 or CUN )
without risk and living in a risky environment, characterized by a specic monetary policy cong-
uration]. All the numbers reported in tables 5-8 can be compared with the level of consumption
associated to the non-stochastic steady state, which in this model is given by C = 11:47124.
C2 CUN C1  y i
Taylor 1987-1997 LS 6.123 6.21 6.26 .0382 .2352 .26
 = 1:53; y = 0:77;i = 0:0 DT 6.52 6.45 6.49 .0168 .1126 .041
Clarida et al. 1979-1996 LS 5.9 6.07 6.32 .0216 .195 .165
 = 2:15; y = 0:93;i = 0:79 DT 6.5 6.74 6.65 .026 .109 .256
Optimal
 = 1:22; y = 0:1;i = 0:3 LS 6.6 6.25 6.21 .039 .231 .18
 = 1:15; y = 0:92;i = 0:21 DT 6.71 6.51 6.53 .012 .12 .151
Money Targeting Rule LS 6.03 6.6 6.38 .034 .214 .067
DT 5.12 5.42 5.33 .14 .25 .12
US Economy .0106 .1369 .0321
Table 5: results for the Contemporaneous Targeting Rule, Lump Sum Taxes (LS) and
Distortionary Taxation Taxes (DT)
In Table 5 I reported the welfare values reached under several parameter congurations. The
Optimal parameter conguration has been obtained after a grid search over the interval between
(0 and 4) for all the parameter values , y and i. This range of variations for parameters has
been found to be the most empirical plausible range for the parameter of monetary policy reaction
function, as reported by the empirical literature. In Table 5 I have also reported the welfare results
obtained under some benchmark parameter congurations, obtained from the estimated results by
Taylor (1999) and by Clarida, Galì and Gertler (2000). Associated to each rule, I also report the
standard deviation of ination, , output, y, and interest rate, i, as well as the values for those
statistics computed for the US economy.
Each rule result in Table 5 has been computed for a simple Taylor rule like (32) in an economy
with Lump Sum taxation (LS) and with Distortionary Taxation (DT) on the basis of labor taxes,
as described in (26), (28), respectively.
If we compare the value for the parameters characterizing an optimal monetary policy reported
in Table 5 with those proposed by empirical estimates, we nd that in general the ination targeting
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coe¢ cient is higher in the optimal case than in the empirical estimation cases. Moreover, the value
of the income targeting is bigger than what has been showed to be empirically plausible. In the
same guise, the coe¢ cient on interest rate smoothing is lower than what has been found in the
empirical literature. This suggests that monetary authority in the past year has been successful
in ghting against the ination rate, but their policy actions were too focused on ination.
The model with distortionary taxation delivers a combination of policy parameters where the
ination targeting coe¢ cient is bigger than in the lump sum taxation case ( = 1:15, vs.  =
1:22) and the output targeting coe¢ cient is y = 0:92, bigger than y = 0:8, the number delivered
by the optimal rule in the lump sum tax case. Thus, more distorted is the economy lower is to be
the welfare maximizing ination targeting coe¢ cient, and bigger is the output targeting coe¢ cient.
Intuitively, a larger level of distortion requires a stronger policy reaction towards income, relaxing
the tension with respect to ination targeting. Since in the model is nested an AS curve of the
type described by Roberts (1995) and Rotemberg and Woodford (1997, 1998), a too tight ination
targeting policy in an economy with an high level of distortions can determine a recession, or an
excess volatility of output. A less severe ination targeting regime determines a more exible
management of uctuations.
A further qualications of the above results concerns role of scal policy. In what follows I
assumed a passivescal policy, given by the range (27) for  1. Since all the rule highlighted in
Table 5 report ination targeting coe¢ cients bigger than one (i.e. active monetary policy), this
condition coupled with (27), ensures full determinacy of the Rational Expectations Equilibrium
(REE, henceforth).
In the model with lump sum taxes, we note that according to the unconditional welfare mea-
sure, the money targeting rule would have been considered as the optimal rule (with a level of
consumption CUN equal to 6.6, against the value 6.25 associated to the rule optimal under mea-
sure C2). Moreover, a similar argument applies also for the rule based on rst order solution
here represented by the values assumed by C1. Similar considerations can be formulated for the
model with distortionary taxation for which the rule with the parameterization provided by CGG
provides an higher level of consumption than the rule obtained with C2. Such This is an example
of the contradictory results provided by di¤erent welfare measures, classied as spurious welfare
reversalas in Kim and Kim (2002).
Let us consider now the results for the expected ination targeting rule, given by (33). In Table
6 I reported the optimal conguration of parameters obtained after a grid search for ; y; i 2
[0; 4], together with welfare values associated to the same parametrization considered in Table 5.
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C2 CUN C1  y i
Taylor 1987-1997 LS 6.12 6.21 6.25 .018 .1179 .0229
 = 1:53; y = 0:77;i = 0:0 DT 6.45 6.38 6.42 .0166 .1124 .0412
Clarida et al. 1979-1996 LS 6.03 6.22 6.26 .038 .1489 .0732
 = 2:15; y = 0:93;i = 0:79 DT 6.37 6.24 6.27 .026 .109 .2547
Optimal
 = 1:6; y = 0:83;i = 0:17 LS 6.8 6.24 6.31 .015 .091 .095
 = 1:32; y = 0:89;i = 0:24 DT 7.15 6.44 6.47 .0125 .156 .115
Table 6: results for the Expected Ination Targeting Rule, Lump Sum Taxes (LS) and
Distortionary Taxation Taxes (DT)
From the numbers reported in Table 6, we nd that with a rule with expected ination, the
pattern of the results are not too dissimilar from what we have already seen with a contemporaneous
targeting rule. The optimal parameters combination for rule (33) identies an ination targeting
coe¢ cient lower than the estimated empirical values (both Taylor and CGG estimates) and the
output targeting coe¢ cient bigger than the estimated values. At the same time, the interest-rate
smoothing parameter turns out to be lower than the estimated values. Even in this case, we can
report the same sort of considerations raised before: a too high ination targeting coe¢ cient can
create roo for recession because of the excess deationary e¤ect. For what concerns the interest
rate smoothing parameter, the optimal values (reported for both the Lump Sum case and the
Distortionary Tax case), imply a lower value than what has been found in the empirical literature.
Overall, even with the rule with expected ination (both in Lump Sum case and the Distortionary
Tax case) we can say that the optimal value for the ination targeting coe¢ cient is lower than
empirical estimates. Such type of results are close to what has been found by Schmitt-Grohé and
Uribe (2004) under a Ramsey command optimum, where ination targeting coe¢ cient is lower
than one, and the output targeting coe¢ cient is negative. Although such results strictly depend
from the specic scal policy rule considered (i.e. whether scal policy is passive or active), they
emphasize the role of an ination targeting coe¢ cient lower than the estimated value.
For what concerns scal policy, the results reported in Table 6 have been obtained under the
assumption of passive scal policy, as it was for Table 5. Since the values for  in Table 6 are
all bigger than one, the REE is once againa determined.
7.1. Sensitivity Analysis.
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Nominal Rigidities. InTable 7I report the welfare maximizing parameter combination for
the monetary policy rule, when the degree of price stickiness has been raised to p = 20 (the
benchmark value was p = 3). The welfare optimization procedure is based on a grid search over
the parameter space within the interval: ; y; i 2 [0; 4]. The welfare metric is still given by
the second order conditional welfare, as in (41). The optimal parameter values are reported in
Table 7.
Lump Sum Dist. Taxation
C2  y i C2  y i
Current Ination 5.95 1.85 .25 .15 5.73 2.05 .67 .12
Expected Ination 5.42 1.73 .91 .05 5.56 1.9 .74 .08
Table 7: Optimal Monetary Policy when p = 20:
In Table 7 I reported the welfare maximizing parameters for the two monetary policy rules
(with current and expected ination targeting) studied in this paper together with the value of C2
derived from the conditional welfare measure, for both lump sum taxes and distortionary taxation
case. From Table 7 we observe that ination targeting and output targeting coe¢ cients are higher
than their values reported in Tables 5-6 for the benchmark case. Therefore, higher is the degree
of price stickiness, bigger are the ination and output targeting parameters.
The intuition behind this result can be explained as follows: in an economy with price exibility
and perfect competition, the Friedman rule is optimal, i.e. the interest rate is zero and constant.
On the other hand, the economy under study is far from being located on an optimal path: in
this case the Friedman rule is no longer optimal. If taxes on prots were available, full Friedman
allocation would be restored after a 100 per cent tax rate on prots. In absence of that, The
Ramsey planner uses ination as indirect tax on prots in order to restore the optimal allocation.
However, with costly price adjustment the benevolent government wants to keep the price level
constant, but he faces a trade-o¤: from one side, the planner would like to use unexpected price
changes as lump sum tax, or wealth transfers in order to restore the rst best allocation. From
the other side, the planner wants to stabilize the price level to minimize the cost associated to
price changes. With the former alternative, the planner avoids to use distortionary taxation and
interest rate changes as a mean of restoring optimal allocation.
All such considerations explain the reason why optimal monetary policy under a strong degree
of price stickiness is characterized by a more aggressive behavior with respect to ination rate.
In fact, the Planner tries to restore optimal allocation by keeping the price level constant and
by minimizing the cost of price adjustment. The optimal rule indicated in Table 7 implies that
to keep under control ination we need small changes of nominal interest rates. As discussed
previously, such results are in line with the results and the theoretical considerations formulated
by Schmitt-Grohé an Uribe (2004) and Correia, Nicolini and Teles (2001).
Fiscal Policy Parameter. In what follows I am going to consider a similar exercise for the
sensitivity with respect to scal policy parameter  1. I computed welfare e¤ects for the model
when the scal policy reaction function has been raised to 0.8 starting from the benchmark value
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given by 0.05, as reported in Table 4. Given , it is not di¢ cult to check that this value still
respect the range established by the inequality (27), which denes a Passive scal policy.
The optimized values for the monetary policy parameters are given in Table 8.
Lump Sum Dist. Taxation
C2  y i C2  y i
Current Ination 6.18 1.05 .22 .12 5.32 1.02 .56 .15
Expected Ination 6.20 1.28 .89 .21 5.43 1.14 .68 .18
Table 8: Optimal Monetary Policy when  1 = 0:8: Results based on Second
Order Conditional Welfare Measure.
I reported in Table 8 only the welfare computed on the basis of the Conditional Second Order
measure. From the numbers reported in Table 8, we observe that the welfare maximizing parameter
value for  and y are lower than in the case examined in Tables 5 and 6. The reason can be
explained with the logic of the interactions between Fiscal and Monetary policies. According to
Fiscal Theory of the Price Level (FTPL), a tighter scal policy (an increase in  1), absorbs the
large part of the burden for price level determination: therefore, monetary policy can relax the
tension in ghting ination. In fact, with a tighter scal policy, it turns out to be optimal a lower
level of ination targeting parameter, since now taxes adjust more intensively in order to respect
the solvency criteria of the Government Budget Constraint. It is worth to remind that monetary
policy parameters are still bigger than one and the REE is still determinate.
7.2. Impulse response functions. In gures 1-3 I reported the graph of impulse-response
functions for some, selected variables of the model. The impulse response functions are highly
non-linear functions derived from the solution method, as reported in equation (46). In gure 1 I
reported the response of the model with current ination and the parameter combinations which
turned out to be optimal after the grid search (see Table 5) where  = 1:22; y = 0:1, i = 0:3.
In Figure 1 two lines are represented for each graph: the dark line is obtained after simulating
the impulse responses for one standard deviation of the technological shock, while the dotted line
is obtained for a shock which is 1/2 smaller.
From Figure 1 we observe that after a positive technological shock , both output and labor
e¤ort go up. Consumption raises, but only gradually: the graph shows a good internal persistence.
After the shock, nominal rate raises gradually, because of the smoothing parameter involved in the
monetary reaction function. Since ination targeting coe¢ cient is bigger than one and i > 0; the
ination rate decreases8 . At the same time, the joint increase of nominal rate and the reduction
of ination makes public debt to steadily increase and to return back to steady state in the long
run. It is worth to note that the impulse responses showed lack of the liquidity e¤ect: the present
model does not contain a su¢ ciently high degree of nominal rigidity (combined with real rigidity)
to generate the liquidity e¤ect. As proved by Kim (2000) and Marzo (2004a) the liquidity e¤ect
can be obtained only by introducing a substantial degree of inertia.
8The long run impact coe¢ cient on the ination rate equal to 1.74.
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In Figure 2 I report the evolution of impulse-responses for the model including expected ination
and lump sum taxes. The dark line indicates the response pattern for each variable with the
conguration of parameters associated to Clarida, Galì and Gertler (CGG) parametrization (i.e.,
 = 2:15; y = 0:93, i = 0:79), while the dashed line is obtained under the optimal conguration
setting, with  = 1:6; y = 0:83, i = 0:17. From Figure 2 we observe that Impulse-Responses
for the optimal monetary policy allows for a better response with respect to an expansionary
technological shock: the response of the model are much smaller, allowing lower deviations from
steady state than in the CGG case.
Finally, in Figure 3, I reported the same kind of exercise for the current ination targeting
rule with distortionary taxation. As before, the dark line indicates the response pattern for the
CGG conguration, while the dashed line indicates the response pattern for the optimal monetary
function, here characterized by  = 1:15; y = 0:92, i = 0:21 . As in previous pictures, we
observe that the implementation of the optimal monetary policy rule allows a smaller response
patterns of variables, closer to their steady state values.
To sum up, these pictures show that Impulse Responses based on Second Order solution of the
model provide the same qualitative information than rst order response. However, with second
order Impulse-Response functions the magnitude of the shock hitting the economy is crucial to
determine the long run forecasts of each variable.
A nal remark is about the very long run pattern: the long run impulse responses do not
explode, but they tend to come back to the original steady state position, sign of intrinsic stability
of the model.
8. Concluding Remarks
In this paper it has been shown how the introduction of a new solution method for dynamic
stochastic general equilibrium model up to second order changes the analysis of welfare associated
to di¤erent monetary policy congurations. The model is kept simple in order to make the results
as much comparable as possible with the existing literature. The model is presented in two
versions: one with lump taxation and the other with distortionary taxation on labor income. The
results conrm that the optimal parameter congurations for a monetary policy reaction function
lies within the range specied by the most celebrated empirical studies. Sensitivity analysis shows
that by raising the degree of nominal rigidities, the optimal ination targeting coe¢ cient is slightly
bigger than what has been suggested by empirical work.
When scal policy becomes tighter, the magnitude of the ination targeting parameter becomes
smaller, as prescribed by the Fiscal Theory of the Price Level. The analysis reveals that rst order-
based welfare measures are often misleading in indicating the welfare maximizing parameters, if
compared to conditional second order ones.
Impulse response function are showed to be non-explosive in the long run and in general show
a better degree of persistence of the model. The results here showed need to be generalized for
models with a better design of nominal and real rigidities, in order to properly detect the inertial
behavior of real and nominal variables.
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Figure 1: Second Order Impulse-Responses. Current ination lump sum taxes
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Figure 2: Second Order IRF, ecpected in. lump sum taxes.
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Figure 3: Second Order Impulse-Responses: expected ination targeting
